The Forgotten Gaza Agreement That Challenges the “Open Air Prison” Narrative

In November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA), a U.S.‑brokered framework intended to open Gaza to international trade and travel after Israel’s disengagement. The agreement envisioned a seaport, discussions on reopening the airport, upgraded crossings, and convoys linking Gaza and the West Bank. Within a year, Hamas had won elections, violence escalated, and the AMA effectively collapsed. This abridged article explains what the agreement promised and why it disappeared.

One of the most common claims about Gaza is that Israel withdrew in 2005 only to turn it into an “open‑air prison.” A key document complicates that narrative. In November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA), brokered by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The agreement outlined a path for Gaza to participate in global economic activity.

The AMA committed to opening Rafah under international supervision, upgrading crossings to support Palestinian imports and exports, and establishing bus and truck convoys between Gaza and the West Bank. It affirmed plans for constructing a seaport and recognized the importance of reopening Gaza’s airport, with security discussions to continue. Economic assessments at the time anticipated rising employment, expanding exports, and renewed growth if movement improved.

The agreement was conditioned on security cooperation. A UN report noted that easing closures required “a maximum PA effort to fulfill its security obligations,” and that private‑sector revival was impossible amid conflict and domestic lawlessness. Israel retained control over airspace, maritime security, and certain external security functions, but the AMA aimed to expand movement within that framework.

Implementation faltered quickly. Rocket fire continued, political instability grew, and several provisions stalled. The Gaza–West Bank convoy system never began. Seaport construction did not start. Airport discussions froze.

The timeline shows how rapidly conditions deteriorated. Israel completed its withdrawal in September 2005. The AMA was signed in November, and Rafah opened under EU supervision later that month. By early 2006, implementation slowed. In January, Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. In March, Hamas formed a government; Israel, the U.S., and the EU refused to engage unless Hamas renounced violence and recognized Israel. In June, Hamas militants killed two Israeli soldiers and kidnapped Gilad Shalit, prompting Operation Summer Rains and intermittent Rafah closures. In June 2007, Egypt closed Rafah, and Hamas violently seized control of Gaza. Israel and Egypt tightened border restrictions, and the AMA disappeared from the diplomatic agenda.

The AMA shows that the immediate post‑disengagement vision was not permanent isolation but integration into the global economy. To understand today’s blockade and conflict, the original path and why it collapsed must be part of the discussion.

You can read the full in‑depth Substack version of this article here.

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