Egypt and Jordan routinely voice support for Palestinian statehood, but their actions tell a different story. Egypt has bulldozed homes and expanded buffer zones along Gaza, while Jordan has arrested protesters and quietly maintained security coordination with Israel throughout the Gaza war. Both states, hosting the region’s largest Palestinian populations, increasingly view Palestinian sovereignty not as a solution but as a threat to their own stability.
Egypt’s containment strategy
Egypt’s public posture toward Gaza has long been one of dramatic condemnation, but its policies reflect defensive pragmatism. Beginning in 2014, Egypt demolished thousands of homes in Rafah to eliminate the Hamas‑controlled tunnel economy and prevent fighters from moving between Gaza and Sinai. It later pumped seawater and sewage into the tunnels, collapsing them and rendering surrounding land infertile. After October 7, 2023, Egypt reinforced its border even further. CNN confirmed that bulldozers cleared additional land, while President Abdel Fattah el‑Sisi warned that an exodus from Gaza was intended to “eliminate the Palestinian cause … the most important cause of our region.” Egypt’s message was unmistakable: Gaza’s collapse would not spill into Egypt. Its problems would remain on the Gaza side of the fence.
Jordan’s political calculus
Jordan’s approach to the West Bank is shaped by fear of internal destabilization. King Abdullah II regularly condemns Israeli actions and affirms support for Palestinian statehood. Jordan Times quoted Prime Minister Bisher Khasawneh calling displacement a “red line” and a violation of the peace treaty. Yet Jordan’s domestic policy tells another story. The memory of the 1970 Black September uprising still haunts the monarchy. Palestinians make up more than half the population, and while many are citizens, others — especially Gazans — remain in long‑term refugee status. Jordan has even revoked citizenship from some who fled the West Bank in 1967 and maintain ties with residents of the Palestinian Authority.
Any radicalization or instability in the former Jordanian‑occupied territories could spill across the river, emboldening calls to declare Jordan the “Palestinian state.” During the Gaza war, Jordan allowed large rallies to signal solidarity but suppressed activity aligned with Hamas or Islamist groups. Amnesty International reported arrests of pro‑Hamas activists, restrictions on protests, prohibitions on Palestinian flags, and policing of social media. Meanwhile, Jordan quietly maintained its security coordination with Israel, enabling Amman to monitor threats in the West Bank without direct intervention.
Why both states prefer the status quo
Egypt and Jordan have paid a heavy price for decades of proximity to Palestinian political movements: uprisings, ideological infiltration, refugee waves, and diplomatic entanglements. Today, both prioritize survival over symbolism. Palestinian sovereignty is no longer seen as a solution but as a risk. Israeli control over Judea and Samaria — and even Gaza — may no longer be viewed as inherently unacceptable. Yet, rather than formal Israeli sovereignty, both governments prefer a managed Palestinian autonomy under Israeli security control, coordinated quietly through Washington. Publicly, they can continue to support “two states.” Privately, they support the status quo, as long as it stays quiet.
This is the logic of states that have learned the cost of instability. Unlike the Gulf states, whose quiet abandonment is driven by economic diversification and strategic alliances, Egypt and Jordan’s approach is defensive, rooted in immediate security concerns. This explains their continued coordination with the IDF, their refusal to absorb Gazan refugees, and the increasingly hollow tone of their condemnations of Israel. Their peace treaties with Israel — cold but essential — remain pillars of regime survival.
Egypt and Jordan have learned to stop pushing for Palestinian statehood. Their concerns now mirror those of the entire region: security, legitimacy, prosperity, and staying in power. But this strategy carries risks. As long as their populations remain tied to narratives of grievance, quiet pragmatism may eventually face backlash. Without a broader shift in public expectations — including acceptance of Israel’s permanence and the reality that no Palestinian state is emerging — regional stability will remain fragile.
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Full Series
- The Gulf States have moved on from Palestine
- Statehood? Not so fast The Gulf’s real attitude to Palestine
- Neighbours Egypt and Jordan privately oppose Palestinian statehood
- Diplomacy’s Denial: American and the peace process that is not
- Europe loudly says “Palestinian state.” Under its breath: “not really.”
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