Decision Making Tool to Understand Political Position of non-Politician – Part I
While a therapist, I devised a decision making tool that helped my clients sort out dilemmas and choose the alternative that best fit their values and their goals. I called it the cost-cost table because we only measure the potential costs of Alternative A versus the potential costs of Alternative B. This is different from weighing costs versus benefits of both: our brains cannot cope with the four-cell table and, in any case, we do not have to, since the benefits of one are generally the costs of the other. And we all want all the benefits of both alternatives without having to pay any of the costs. (If you want a more in-depth explanation of the tool with examples from my clinical practice, you can read this published article.)
I wondered if this tool could help elucidate the most salient issue facing Israeli citizens today: ending the Hamas-Gaza war now versus continuing with it. Both sides of the argument want the hostages home yesterday. The disagreement centers on whether that is better achieved through signing a deal ASAP and ending the war ASAP (now) versus those who believe that ongoing military pressure will bring about the conditions under which we will see the release of the hostages.
I asked a friend with whom I disagree on this matter if she would be willing to give it a try. Knowing her openness and curiousity, I was not surprised that she agreed. She did not want to be named so I am calling her Molly.
This article illustrates an exercise used to clarify the position of someone with whom I disagree. I largely refrain from injecting myself into this article and in Part II, I describe my personal reactions to the exercise and my conclusions.
When I mentioned that the IDF could relieve us all of the need to consider whether or not to continue the war by just rescuing them all now, Molly’s face lit up. That would certainly be the best for the hostages, their families, the entire country. But, alas, that is not likely to happen. In any case, the government might decide to continue the war to continue to decimate Hamas, the main goal of the war, in my opinion.
Setting that unlikelihood aside, we got busy with filling in a table listing the potential costs of ending the war now versus the potential costs of continuing to fight. (If you can think of costs we did not, please write them in the comments below the article.)
IMPORTANT NOTE: This is not my opinion, it is not what I think the government should do, it is not the list I would do with someone who actually has responsibility for making the decisions — it is an attempt on my part to understand how a left wing individual can call for ending the war now (prematurely, in my opinion).
Cost-Cost Table
I asked Molly to begin by listing the costs of the alternative she does not support: continuing the war. I did not have to add anything to what she said. Then I asked her to list the costs of ending the war, the alternative she would like to see happen. Here, I added the last item on the list and she accepted it.
The first thing I noticed was that Molly is not in La La land – she sees the potential problems with trying to reach a deal with Hamas and does not sugar-coat ending the war. I wonder how many of the demonstrators pressing for a deal “now” are as realistic as she is. I was curious about where examination of her points would take us.
The next step was to view the two lists to see if there are items repeated on both sides and, therefore, that cancel themselves out. In the current case, there is only one – and that is the one related to return of the hostages. I find it interesting that both sides of this dilemma leave open the question of release of our hostages, the main plea demonstrators shout out as they block roads: “Bring them home now”.
Here is the same table with the hostages items crossed out:
The next step is to determine the nature of each of the two columns above: what is the essence of the costs of ending the war and what is the essence of the costs of continuing it. Perhaps, as you see this written, you come up with something different than we did discussing it “live”.
a. Nature of the costs of ending the war: the threat remains that even ending the war will not stop war and we will still not be safe.
b. Nature of the costs of continuing to fight: further damage to everyone without an end in sight.
The next step in this process is always trying to see what can be done to reduce the possibility that one will have to pay some or all of the costs on either side. Therefore, what ensued was a discussion of the conditions that would make a deal that Molly would consider an insurance policy against the potential costs of ending the war ASAP and this is the deal she would sign:
1. All of Gaza has to be demilitarized and Sinwar put on trial;
2. All hostages returned, dead and live, as soon as the deal is signed;
3. Hamas recognizes the right for Israel to exist as a sovereign state;
4. Israel leaves Gaza and builds a wall similar to that built by Egypt: high, deep into the ground, thick; and
5. Security arrangements (perhaps Egypt guards Philadelphi Corridor with the IDF supervising).
Release of prisoners did not enter into this and Molly was unconcerned about this.
Is there any chance that Hamas would accept a deal under the terms above? What is in it for them? The only thing they get out of it is getting the IDF out of Gaza. The Gazan population sans Hamas stands to gain if they can be helped to develop their own local government (not the PLO and not Hamas, of course) that is more interested in the people living good lives than in destroying the Jewish state. But it is Hamas that would have to sign on the dotted line – so what is in it for them?
Regarding the potential costs of continuing the war, in order to intelligently discuss that, we would have to know the exact criteria for ending the war. Is it anything less than total surrender on the part of Hamas (and Islamic Jihad, let’s not forget them)?
A Day Later
I wanted to make sure that I represented Molly accurately in this article so we had a brief continuation on WhatsApp of our discussion from yesterday.
She wrote:
I think I was being overly optimistic to suggest that Hamas would accept Israel as a sovereign state but perhaps we could exchange that for Hamas proclaiming a long term hudna. Although I realize their ability not to hold to their promises, such a declaration has religious meaning for them more than a ceasefire and has even been suggested by them in the past. [see here]
Molly found the exercise useful and it showed her that the situation is dire regardless of which way we go. She thinks that we need to make it clear to the world that our goal is for making a deal and ending the war.
Then she said that, for her, a true end to the state of constant threat of war would be an overall peace agreement with the Palestinian Arabs and an end to the occupation. That opens up a whole new can of worms that I wanted to leave for another day.
And it turns out that that may be the crux of the whole matter.
This latter point leads me to conclude that regardless of the particular argument in which we may be engaged (hostages, judicial reform, other), the bone of contention is occupation, yes or no! Aside from when our backs are against the wall and we bare our teeth together against a murderous enemy, there may be no way to achieve unity among us when the main issue that divides us is the fate of lands “occupied” in 1967 – according to one side – and “liberated” – according to the other side.
I think I finally understand the degree of anxiety that lies behind the loud demonstrations against the government regardless of what the contemporary context is for those demonstrations. It is an anxiety that is perhaps not much less intense than that caused by the horrors of what happened on Oct 7th. Is it possible that our fellow left wing Israelis are as afraid of what the right wing majority in this country will bring down upon us all as they are of the Palestinian Arabs who want us dead? Perhaps if the left wing was the majority today, I would be as afraid of them as they are of me because I see in their activisms the same dangers to Israel as they see in the actions of the right wing coalition. (I see the Oslo Accords as an example of what I am afraid the left might do again were they in the decision making chair.)
In Part II of this two-part article, I go back to the cost-cost table to see what else I got out of the discussion with Molly.